University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Journal of Inequality Inquiry
2019

Is My Family Constitution Unconstitutional?
Allison Anna Tait

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/jii

Recommended Citation
Tait, Allison Anna, "Is My Family Constitution Unconstitutional?" (2019). Journal of Inequality Inquiry. 4.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/jii/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Inequality Inquiry collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

1

Is My Family Constitution Unconstitutional?
By Allison Anna Tait†
[Edward’s] mother explained to him her liberal
designs, in case of his marrying Miss Morton; told him
that she would settle on him the Norfolk estate, which,
clear of land-tax, brings in a good thousand ayear . . . and in opposition to this, if he still persisted in
this low connection [to Lucy], represented to him the
certain penury that must attend the match.
- Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility1
Introduction
Every high-wealth family should write a constitution, at least
that’s what wealth managers say.2 Because, “[w]ithout careful
planning and stewardship, a hard earned fortune can easily be
dissipated within a generation or two.”3 The aphorism
“shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations”4 vividly
† Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Thanks to Erez Aloni,
Alex Boni-Saenz, Erin Collins, Meredith Harbach, Claudia Haupt, Corinna Lain,
Luke Norris, Carol Sanger, Sarah Swan and participants in panels at both the 2018
International Society of Family Law North American Regional Conference:
Inequality and the Future of Family Law at the University of Minnesota Law School
and the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association.
1. JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 232 (Claire Lamont ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1970) (1811).
2. High-Net-Worth (HNW) families are worth at least $5M, according to industry
standards. Ultra-High-Net-Worth (UHNW) families are typically worth $30M by the
same standards. High Net Worth Individual, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investope
dia.com/terms/h/hnwi.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). Constitutions are also
recommended for other families, but for those without significant wealth transfer
and preservation concerns, the needs are different. See Linda C. McClain, Family
Constitutions and the (New) Constitution of the Family, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 833,
846 (2006) (discussing the various contexts in which a family may choose to
implement a constitution).
3. JAMES E. HUGHES JR., FAMILY WEALTH: KEEPING IT IN THE FAMILY; HOW
FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR ADVISERS PRESERVE HUMAN, INTELLECTUAL, AND
FINANCIAL ASSETS FOR GENERATIONS 3 (rev. & expanded ed. 2004); see also Brian
Groom, The Rise of the Family Business Constitution, FINANCIAL TIMES (Dec. 13,
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5d06ec9e-c61b-11e7-b30e-a7c1c7c13aab (“Where
the goal of the family is to continue to manage … family wealth collectively across
the generations, a constitution can be very helpful.”).
4. HUGHES, supra note 3, at 3 (“[V]ariations of this proverb are found around the
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captures this phenomenon and its universalism demonstrates how
widespread and entrenched the problem is.
The family constitution, as the name implies, is a
governance document that a high-wealth family creates (with the
help of a wealth advisor or wealth consulting team). This
document sets forth the rules that family members will adhere to
in order to protect the family fortune from various kinds of
creditor claims, family feuds, and reckless investments.5 The
constitutional template provides “an overlying set of family
principles and governance protocols that keep the different
interests and parts of the family wealth structures working
together efficiently and successfully.”6
Wealth advisors recommend basing family constitutional
design on political constitutions, in particular the United States
Constitution.7 To this end, wealth advisors suggesting that it
contain a statement of values (similar to a preamble), and
procedures for establishing executive, legislative, and judicial
branches.8 The executive branch, about which there is little
world.”); see also Shirtsleeves to Shirtsleeves in Three Generations, THE MORGAN
STANLEY PRIVATE WEALTH MANAGEMENT PODCAST (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.mor
ganstanley.com/what-we-do/wealth-management/private-wealth-management/shirt
sleeves-to-shirtsleeves (“The proverb is certainly not unique to the western
world. Clogs to clogs, stalls to stalls, rice paddy to rice paddy, shirtsleeves to
shirtsleeves. It is a universal cultural proverb because it describes human nature.”).
5. Consultants recommend that a family constitution “include a minimum of 20
to 25 pages and a maximum of 70 pages (including appendices) when the content is
more juridical and the family is more complex.” Rocio Arteaga & Susana MenéndezRequejo, Family Constitution and Business Performance: Moderating Factors, 30(4)
FAM. BUS. REV 320, 322 (2017); see also Drawing Up a Family Constitution, BAKER
TILLY HUGHES BLAKE, https://web.archive.org/web/20171117073820/https://www.ba
kertillyhb.ie/family-constitution/ (“[T]he Constitution can prove a difficult document
to finalise, with many areas open to conflicting views.”) (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
These consultants also recommend allowing six to eight months to create a
constitution because “it takes time for family members to agree and commit to the
Family Constitution.” Arteaga & Menéndez-Requejo, supra, at 323.
6. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, THE FAMILY CONSTITUTION GUIDE 6 (2014), https://u
nited-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/documents/get/88/the-family-constitution-guide.p
df.
7. One consultant clarifies that there is really only one choice in terms of political
rule: “Every family I know . . . decides that a republic is the best system of family
governance.” HUGHES, supra note 3, at 24.
8. Alexander Koeberle-Schmid, The Benefits of a Family Constitution, KPMG
(July 10, 2017), https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2017/07/a-family-consti
tution-increases-family-cohesion-and-business-connectivity.html
(“[Creating
a
family constitution] can take between six to twelve months.”); Rupert Walker, The
Lasting Legacy, THE PEAK 90, 92 (BNY Mellon), https://www.bnymellonwealth.com/
assets/pdfs-strategy/the_peak_chuck_long.pdf (“Typically, this process lasts one or
two years.”). But c.f. Family Constitution, ATENEO FAM. BUS. DEV. CTR., http://atene
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discussion, may act as an administrative branch or may consist
of a council that possesses the authority to make quick decisions
on either routine matters or in emergency situations.9 The
legislative branch is tasked with creating rules to govern the
behavior of family members in a variety of domains, but
especially on matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, and death
– events that have the potential to be costly in a financial sense
without the proper legal safeguards.10 Finally, the judicial branch,
using family constitutions, mediate when family members
encounter conflict or violate rules, to offer advisory opinions on
matters of family business, or to adjudicate issues of concern.11
But why, precisely, do wealth advisors suggest a
constitution? Why not a mission statement or a strategic plan,
building on the family-as-business analogy? Constitutions are
critical, wealth advisors state, because they create a structure to
govern all family members and their relationships to family
wealth.12 The constitution acts as a governance mechanism – a
form of disciplinary technology – and enables a high-wealth
family to control the behavior of its members in a way that other
expressions of family purpose, like a mission statement, do not.
The family constitution is more than a set of bylaws, a plan for
inheritance, or the documentation of family aspirations.13 A
family constitution is a scaffold that supports and regulates the
family by imposing a governmental frame.14
Despite the fact that wealth managers use this analogy
between family and political constitution unwaveringly, one
ofamilybusiness.weebly.com/constitution-crafting.html (offering a two-day workshop
to craft a family constitution).
9. Family Governance–The Why, What, and How for Affluent Families, LEBEL
& HARRIMAN (Oct. 25, 2017), http://lebelharriman.com/resources/news/article/2017/
10/25/family-governance--why-what-affluent-families/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. We the Family: The Benefits of Creating a Family Constitution, BROWN
BROTHERS HARRIMAN (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbh.com/en-us/insights/we-thefamily--the-benefits-of-creating-a-family-constitution-24624 (“Traditional governing
documents such as shareholders’ agreements, company bylaws and even estate
planning documents are characterized by technical language necessary to achieve
desired legal, tax and administrative results. This language is not appropriate for a
family constitution.”) (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
13. Id.
14. Id.

4

Sua Sponte

[Spring: 1

question never addressed in the financial planning discourse is:
“How perfect is the analogy between the [family constitution]
and the U.S. Constitution?”15 No analogy is, of course, perfect.
And no one expects a family constitution to replicate the U.S.
constitution in exact detail. Nevertheless, by taking on the form
of a political and democratic constitution, the family constitution
raises the question of what constitutional principles inhere in and
guide this specialized document.
This brief Article posits that the analogy between the two
types of constitutions is imperfect in several significant ways and
mainly because family constitutions largely ignore some of the
core principles that animate a democratic constitution.
Specifically, family constitutions fail to protect minority groups
through a guarantee of equal protection. Likewise, family
members embroiled in conflict lack due process rights, rights that
would help ensure fair treatment and a more transparent exercise
of governmental authority. Finally, the typical family
constitution template fails to provide any mechanism for
amending the constitution, enabling the document to remain
responsive to changing circumstances and the needs of the family
polity.
The family constitution may, in certain respects, mimic the
United States Constitution by layering structure over family
interactions. Whereas the United States Constitution sets forth
the rights and responsibilities of citizens, the family constitution
centers primarily on the responsibilities of family members. In
order for the comparison between the constitutions to be a
dynamic one, a family constitution should also protect the rights
of family members, providing safeguards against embedded
forms of discrimination as well as other instances of
inappropriate dead-hand control. In other words, a family
constitution need not and should not run the risk of its provisions
contravening constitutional values.
I. Family Law Rules
The family constitution template is first and foremost “[a]
tool intended to help the family to stay together and to stay
wealthy for more than three generations.”16 Accordingly, family
15. McClain, supra note 2, at 840. McClain takes a different track in her article
than the approach taken here. She uses family constitutions to explore the difference
between a constructivist model of the family and the “natural” model. Id. at 836.
16. CHRISTIAN G. STEWART, FAMILY LEGACY ASIA (HK) LTD., HOW TO CRAFT
YOUR OWN FAMILY CONSTITUTION: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2013), http://www.familylegacy
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events and relationships that implicate wealth distribution and
erosion are a special concern for the family government.17 One
of the core areas of regulation, then, is what we would consider
family wealth rules–rules concerning marriage, divorce, and the
transfer of wealth on death. Wealth advisors recommend that
families pay particular attention to these rules because
“[u]nexpected death, or the divorce of a family member . . . can
paralyse a structure and produce major problems and uncertainty
for the family members who have a stake in the family wealth
structures.”18
In this Section, I describe what typical family wealth rules
look like in a family constitution and analyze the ways in which
the typical rules may constrain the behavior of family members.
A. Marriage Rules
One of the most important tasks delegated to the family
legislature is to craft the rules that govern family marital
relationships.19 Advisors suggest that families pay particular
attention to divorce because “[m]atrimonial breakdown is a
major problem for family wealth structures.”20 Divorce, advisors
warn, has the potential to be “one of the world’s biggest
destroyers of wealth. . .[because]. . .laws designed to protect a
spouse can be abused to provide a spouse with rights to family
businesses and wealth that by no stretch of the imagination
should they have access to.”21

asia.com/whitepaper_pdf/Overview%20of%20how%20to%20craft%20a%20family%2
0constitution.pdf.
17. The other most important area of law for the family is corporate law. Family
legislatures are encouraged to create a system of rules to facilitate the smooth
running of the family business. See, e.g., McClain, supra note 2, at 865–68.
18. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 9. A family constitution might also
address “the risk that a family member becomes the ‘black sheep’ of the family in
that they fail to properly engage with the family office/businesses or with the ethos
of the family.” Id. at 7. Or, the constitution might govern the procedure for dealing
with “a substantial claim brought by a creditor against the family.” Id. at 9. A card
game makes this clear— Keeps Me Awake at Night—where “[e]ach card describes a
particular issue related to wealth, like ‘Legacy’ or ‘Illness & Death.’” Robert Milburn,
SunTrust Uses Games to Help Clients Prioritize Finances, BARRON’S (Oct. 2, 2015),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/suntrust-uses-games-to-help-clients-prioritize-fin
ances-1443801518.
19. McClain, supra note 2, at 865–68.
20. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 33.
21. PHILIP MARCOVICI, THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF FAMILY WEALTH: A GUIDE
TO SUCCESSION PLANNING, ASSET PROTECTION, TAXATION, AND WEALTH
MANAGEMENT 107, 112 (2016).
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In a number of jurisdictions, wealth managers warn that it is
easy to secure the court’s jurisdiction to deal with matrimonial
disputes and also to persuade the court “to take a robust approach
to family wealth structures.”22 Wealth managers routinely stress
the significant discretion that family court judges have (the U.K.
is often used as an example), such that even placing family assets
in a discretionary asset-protection trust might not suffice to
protect them at divorce. High-profile divorces such as the 2014
Poon case in which the wife of Otto Poon received a payout of
over HK$700 million after trust assets were determined to be
marital property23 have reinforced this message.24
To address the problem of divorce, family constitutions
routinely dictate certain protocols for family members who are
planning marriage, most commonly requiring that they create
prenuptial agreements. Prenuptial agreements allow the highwealth family “to ‘ring-fence’ family wealth that a son or
daughter may have inherited or will be inheriting during their
lifetime.”25 This “ring-fencing” is accomplished mostly by
specifying certain characterizations of marital and separate
property, what assets will go to each spouse in the event of a
divorce, and choice of law preferences.26 Wealth managers claim
that putting such protocols in the family constitution may be an
advantage not just for the family balance sheet but also for the
family member contemplating marriage: “What’s great about this
approach is it allows your daughter to tell her future husband,
‘this prenuptial agreement isn’t my idea, my family is making me
do it,’ which could smooth over what would otherwise be a
difficult conversation.”27 To ensure the effectiveness of the
22. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 33.
23. Julie Chu, HK$766m Divorce Payout for Ex-Wife of Leading Engineer Otto
Poon, S. CHINA MORNING POST (July 17, 2014), https://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/article/1555849/hk766-m-divorce-payout-ex-wife-leading-engineer-otto-poon.
24. Jennifer Hughes, Hong Kong Divorce Case Rattles Family Trust Industry,
FIN. TIMES (July 17, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/f953e8e4-0d92-11e4-815f00144feabdc0.
25. Abby Schultz, Prenuptial Agreements Gain Traction in Asia, BARRON’S (Dec.
18, 2015), https://www.barrons.com/articles/prenuptial-agreements-gain-tractionin-asia-1450409202.
26. See TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 7 (“For example, [the constitution]
can seek to anticipate and deal with difficult situations such as the marriage
breakdown of certain members of the family.”).
27. Schultz, supra note 25 (“It’s a much better sales pitch . . . But writing a
prenuptial agreement requirement into a family constitution, while practiced in
Europe and the U.S., is not common among wealthy families in East Asia, at least
not yet.”) (internal citations omitted); see TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 16
(“A structured dialogue . . . will de-sensitize these issues and foster an environment
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prenuptial agreement, wealth advisors also recommend that the
family constitution mandate the creation of small trusts for all
individuals who marry into the family. These small trusts,
advisors remark, “throw a bone to the divorcing sons- and
daughters-in-law, heading off challenges to the real family
wealth.”28
Family constitutions may, in addition to requiring a
prenuptial agreement, include provisions about who family
members may marry. For example, in the well-known case of
Shapira v. Union National Bank, a father conditioned a bequest
to one of his sons such that the son “should receive his share of
the bequest only if he is married at the time of my death to a
Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish.”29 If the son did not
marry a Jewish girl within seven years after the death of the
father, then the money was to go to the State of Israel.30 Family
constitutions could, likewise, stipulate that family members were
required to marry within a certain race or ethnicity—or
alternately prohibit certain marital unions based on race,
ethnicity, religion, or sexual orientation.31
Accordingly, marriage law rules in family constitutions may
further the family’s wealth preservation goals but these rules may
also abridge the marital choices and freedom of family members.
B. Wealth Transfer on Death
Death is another event in the family wealth timeline that can
trouble wealth management if the proper planning is not put into
place—and an event wealth managers recommend families
address. Here again, family constitutions can be extremely useful
in providing a reliable framework for wealth transfer upon the
death of family members. Estate planning done through the
family constitution not only helps families avoid probate
proceedings and transfer tax on death, but also ensures that
family assets are distributed according to a well-designed plan
rather than through default rules. Advisors emphasize that the
of understanding and mutual respect.”).
28. BROOKE HARRINGTON, CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS AND
THE ONE PERCENT 164 (2016) (emphasis in original).
29. Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1974).
30. Id.
31. Incentive trusts, which are popular mechanisms for extending control over
family members, are used to the same effect and condition the receipt of trust
distributions on a wide array of conditions, from school enrollment to sobriety to
staying married. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 9–10 (10th ed. 2017).
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family constitution is not the place to detail the substance of an
estate plan—that is most likely done in trust documents and
perhaps an accompanying will. Nevertheless, the family
constitution can add detail to the estate planning documents and
put them in context with more personal detail than might go into
the legal documents.32
Some family constitution rules might be practical without
being onerous, placing little burden on family members. Family
constitutions might require, for example, that all family members
engage in estate planning by creating a will or trust, make
provisions for guardians as needed, and keep beneficiary
designations up-to-date. Family constitution rules for wealth
transfer might also, however, burden or constrain the rights of
certain family members. Safeguarding family wealth as much as
possible, the family constitution might outline general
expectations of who a family member’s beneficiaries will be at
death and might circumscribe bequests or transfers outside the
family. This is particularly true if the wealth transfer involves
shares in the family business and an accompanying transfer of
organizational leadership. The family constitution might, in these
cases, contain directives about succession planning in the family
business and might dictate the transfer of leadership (and
ownership) to one particular person in the family. Ideally, the
family would discuss and debate all of these provisions.
Nevertheless, these kinds of provisions could be included by the
family founder or other family leaders without discussion or even
notice.
Ultimately, then, because family law directives can help
manage how money flows in and out of the family at marriage,
divorce, and death, family legislatures must provide rules and
guidelines for dealing with these major family events in order to
maximize wealth preservation.
II. Family Member Rights
While family constitutions set forth, sometimes in great detail,
the responsibilities of family members in the great project of
managing family money, these same documents are almost
uniformly silent about some of the most basic rights of family
members. In this Section, I discuss how this lack of certain family
member rights creates a disjuncture with the constitutional
32. See Deborah S. Gordon, Mor[t]ality, and Identity: Wills, Narratives, and
Cherished Possessions, 28(2) YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 266–67 (2016).
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framing and democratic aspirations of the high-wealth families
writing family constitutions.

A. The Absent Equal Protection Clause
One ‘constitutional’ principle that is notably absent from the
family constitution template is any mention—much less
guarantee—of equality or non-discrimination. A hallmark of
most democratic constitutions has typically been a statement of
equality between citizens.33 One example of this type of equality
safeguard appears in the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.34 This Clause protects
citizens from rules that draw a distinction among people based
on specific characteristics, such as race, gender, age, disability,
or other traits, attempting to both recognize, secure, and preserve
minority-group rights.35
Citizenship built through the family constitution brings few,
if any, assurances of equal treatment among family members or
safeguards of the right to be safe from discrimination.
Accordingly, as discussed in the previous section, family
constitutions may include provisions with marital restrictions
that evidence various kinds of bias or discriminatory intent. What
are we to make, then, of the constitutionality of a family
constitution with such provisions?
Courts have already taken up and answered some of these
questions about the constitutionality in the context of restricted
bequests. In Shapira, where the father required his son to marry
a Jewish woman in order to inherit, the court ruled that the
bequest did not infringe the son’s constitutional rights because he
was indeed free to marry whomever he wished, even though his
choice might entail a financial cost.36 Because the conditional
33. See generally Freedom and Equality, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://w
ww.americanbar.org/groups/civics/freedom_and_equality.html (offering a civics
educational curriculum exploring freedom and equality in the United States).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This constitutional amendment was ratified
following the U.S. Civil War. “The Constitution as originally drafted and ratified had
no provisions assuring equal protection of the laws. This, of course, is not surprising
for a document written for a society where blacks were enslaved and where women
were routinely discriminated against.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
711 (4th ed. 2013).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, at 716.
36. Id. at 827–28. “In the case at bar, this court is not being asked to enforce any
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bequest did not did not place a total ban on the son’s marrying,
the ban did not violate public policy.37 Reinforcing this
conclusion, was the fact that no child has any legal right or
entitlement to an inheritance (unlike a surviving spouse).38 Any
bequest, gift, or trust distribution that a child receives is, legally
speaking, an act of generosity rather than the fulfillment of an
expectation.39
Shapira, accordingly, demonstrates the limits of
constitutional thinking regarding restrictions placed on marriage
in the inheritance context. Nevertheless, the ruling in Shapira has
its own limits and other, different restrictions might easily violate
public policy in the constitutional calculus—especially
restrictions aimed at limiting a family members marriage
according to race or gender. Restrictions in a family constitution
that place a total restraint on a family member’s right to marry
or, alternately, encourage divorce would clearly be against
constitutional principle and public policy.40 Consequently, if
families want to take seriously the notion of a democratic family
constitution and all the guarantees that come with it, then it is
important the document provide certain protections against
inequality and discrimination.
B. The Due Process Deficit
Another constitutional principle intimately connected to
democratic governance is that of due process. Due process rights
are meant to provide citizens with certain protections against
arbitrary decision-making, unchecked judicial discretion, and
undisclosed processes.41 The right of due process generally
“refers to the procedures that the government must follow before

restriction upon Daniel Jacob Shapira’s constitutional right to marry. Rather, this
court is being asked to enforce the testator’s restriction upon his son’s
inheritance.” Id. at 827.
37. Id. at 829. “It is the conclusion of this court that public policy should not, and
does not preclude the fulfillment of Dr. Shapira’s purpose, and that in accordance
with the weight of authority in this country, the conditions contained in his will are
reasonable restrictions upon marriage, and valid.” Id. at 832.
38. Id. at 828. A surviving spouse cannot be disinherited because of the elective
share, etc. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 31, at 521.
39. Id.
40. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 31, at 12 (“The weight of authority
holds that a total or general restraint on marriage or a provision encouraging divorce
is void as contrary to public policy unless the donor’s dominant purpose was to
provide support until marriage or in the event of a divorce.”).
41. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, at 1143.

2019]

Is My Family Constitution Unconstitutional?

11

it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.”42 This is another
way in which the family constitution template falls short. The
typical family constitution makes no mention of due process
rights. On the contrary, some of the judicial provisions and
procedures included in the family constitution may actually run
the risk of unfairly abridging the due process rights of family
members.
The judicial branch as established by a family constitution
is, broadly construed, meant to help families navigate conflict by
providing “protocols”43 or a “road map”44 to deal with problems.
And, ideally, creating and maintaining a judicial branch allows
family problems to be resolved with the least amount of
emotional and psychological drama possible: “The desired
outcome is rational economic and family welfare decisions that
are not overwhelmed by traditional family dynamics.”45
Nowhere in the family constitution literature, however, do the
concepts of fair hearing and procedural rights factor into the
design of the family judiciary.
In general, the dispute resolution process as managed by the
judicial branch is envisioned as something more akin to
mentoring or mediation. Wealth advisors suggest that this is a
role particularly suited to “family elders”46 who have the
necessary experience and wisdom to confront and navigate
conflicts when they arise.47 One example epitomizes this
emphasis on friendly intermediation: “The members of one
business-owning family hold a family meeting every six months.
. . In addition to a facilitator, the family meetings are always
42. Id. In the United States Constitution, due process rights are—like equal
protection rights—enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
43. Arteaga & Menéndez-Requejo, supra note 8, at 322.
44. See Four Keys to Writing Your Family Constitution for 2016, STEWARDSHIP
(Dec. 28, 2015), https://www.stewardship.com/articles/4-keys-to-writing-your-family
-constitution.
45. ERNESTO J. POZA, FAMILY GOVERNANCE: HOW LEADING FAMILIES MANAGE
THE CHALLENGES OF WEALTH 3 (Credit Suisse Group 2016), https://www.creditsuisse.com/media/assets/apac/docs/cs-family-governance-white-paper.pdf.
46. Id. If the family group is a small one, the judicial decision-makers may be the
parents, which may already be problematic since parents are inherently vested with
a positional authority that children may be unwilling to question. HUGHES, supra
note 3, at 22 (“[T]hese matters naturally flow up for decision to my parents.”).
47. A family elder is, according to one advisor, not necessarily defined by age but
rather by their ability “to bridge the communication gap between generations.”
Stewart, supra note 16, at 48.
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attended by a retired uncle-in-law, whose business sense and
judgment is respected by the founder and the sons.”48 This type
of advisory role fits neatly with the “family elder” persona, and
many examples given by wealth advisors focus on this type of
family business mentoring.49 In this way, the judicial branch can
help family members navigate the wealth preservation rules by
offering a form of advisory opinions.50
Unsurprisingly, however, other situations can and do arise
in which the family judiciary might be called upon to act in a
more arbitral role: “Family elders can be given the authority in
the family constitution to facilitate resolutions when there are
disputes among family members, or otherwise have
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the family’s conflictresolution processes.”51 When these kinds of more persistent and
acrimonious family conflicts arise, several due process problems
with the family constitution become more evident.
First, the family constitution literature contains no language
about judicial sanctions or sentencing—the consequences of
violating family constitution rules are never mentioned. What
penalties, then, would be at the disposal of the “Council of
Family Elders” and how might the Council evaluate the
situation? The most obvious penalties would be financial ones—
family members who violate family constitution rules might be
in danger of losing access to trust distributions, an allowance,
family employment, or other types of financial subsidy from the
family coffers. Losing a bequest or trust distribution might not be
against constitutional principles, as Shapira teaches us.
Nevertheless, the potentially arbitrary nature of these kinds of ad
hoc penalties and sanctions, imposed without notice, present a
troubling fit with democratic constitutional principles of due
process.
A second problem with the judicial management of the
family is that family members are often barred from taking their
grievances outside of the family. One wealth management
company presents an interesting example in which a son
disagreed “with his father, and other senior executives of the

48. Stewart, supra note 16, at 47.
49. Id.
50. Hughes states that one of the roles of the judicial branch is to “[r]ender the
advisory opinions to the family.” HUGHES, supra note 3, at 174.
51. The same advisor suggests that the family elder role might be performed by
a trust protectors committee. Id.
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family business . . . .”52 Their dispute resulted in an attempt on
the son’s part to begin “legal proceedings in a jurisdiction that
would have resulted in a public and damaging fight over his
position.”53 Fortunately for the family, the wealth manager
remarks, “clearly stated family protocols” in the family
constitution prevented the son from taking such action and
safeguarded the family’s wealth, privacy, and reputation.54 These
kinds of restrictions on access to decision-making fora and public
processes could be construed as a violation of the family
member’s due process rights, especially if the family member has
not consented to abide by such terms and conditions.
Providing a window into how these kinds of clauses in
family constitutions may or may not inhibit due process rights,
courts are currently addressing similar kinds of conditions in the
context of mandatory arbitration clauses in both wills and trust
documents. For example, in a 2004 case from Arizona,
Schoneberger v. Oelze,55 the court considered the validity of a
trust created by parents for their two daughters that “set[] out in
minute detail dispute resolution procedures.”56 These procedures
were ordered in “progressive stages of increasing complexity and
involvement,” beginning with a “‘Stage One-Notice of
Discomfort’ and ending with a ‘Stage Six-Arbitration.’”57 When
the daughters brought claims against the trustee to court ten years
later,58 the court held that the beneficiaries had not given their
consent to arbitration and, consequently, mandatory arbitration
was unacceptable.59
Family constitution framers who want their constitutions to
align not just in form but also in substance with democratic
constitutions should demonstrate a concern for the due process
rights of all family members. Family framers should task the
judiciary branch with creating standardized responses to family
52. TAYLOR WESSING LLP, supra note 6, at 11.
53. Id.
54. Id. Again, the literature is largely silent on what penalties might have
befallen the son if he had violated the family protocol.
55. 96 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, Act of May
21, 2008, ch. 247, § 16, 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1119 (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 1410205 (2012)).
56. Id. at 1080.
57. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Approximately ten years after the trusts were created, the daughters
brought claims of breach of trust, conversion, and fraudulent concealment against
the trustees, claiming in addition that the trustees had mismanaged and dissipated
the trust funds. Id.
59. Id. at 1083–84.
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constitution violations and seek ratification and approval of these
terms and conditions from the larger family. Family constitutions
will be constitutional in principle as well as configuration only
when the guarantee of procedural safeguards and fair processes
for family members is in place.
C. The Overlooked Amendment Process
Finally, family constitutions should address processes for
modification in order to actualize the constitutional principles of
their political counterparts. Ideally, any problems of
discriminatory rules or unfair processes that arise with a family
constitution should be able to be addressed, as needed, through
constitutional amendment.60 The ability to amend outdated
provisions and the mechanism for doing so are essential if the
constitution is to remain responsive to circumstances and vital
within its time: “Changes in social organization, in technology,
and in morality all require that the constitution evolve . . . Those
drafting a constitution cannot possibly imagine the myriad of
issues that will arise decades and centuries later.”61 In the
language of family wealth, the ability to amend a governing
document helps to mitigate the excesses and inefficiencies of
dead-hand control.62
Family constitutions generally do not contain a mechanism
for amendment or even any language to address the problems of
an unchanging document. One wealth consultant, going against
the grain, has recognized this problem and states: “It is unrealistic
to expect a single, unrevised family constitution to withstand the
many changes that will occur in the future …. [and] future family
members may not feel an allegiance to a constitution that they
did not have a hand in creating.”63 The lack of an amendment
mechanism can lead to a certain strain of family constitutions that
60. The United States Constitution provides a mechanism for amendment in
Article 5: “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes. . .” U.S. CONST. art. V.
61. Erwin Chemerinsky, Amending the Constitution, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1561,
1561 (1998).
62. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts
in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
63. Karin Prangley & Anne Warren, We the Family: The Benefits of Creating a
Family Constitution, Brown Brothers Harriman (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbh.co
m/en-us/insights/we-the-family--the-benefits-of-creating-a-family-constitution-2462
4.
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another wealth manager calls “Monument to the Founder”
constitutions, meant to “honor the extraordinary achievements of
the heroic wealth creator.”64
Many family constitutions represent this kind of
“monument” to a founding family member or an original
generational cohort of members. They are documents created to
memorialize the legacy of the person or people who started the
family dynasty or business—sometimes even written by that
same person. One of the problems with this type of constitution
is that, “the bigger the Monument to the Founder, the bigger the
shadow it can cast.”65 Consequently, this kind of constitution can
be “restrictive,” typified by the lack of provision “for easy or fair
exit mechanisms [and by an] unwillingness to have to deal with
the ‘messiness’ of divergent voices and opinions.”66 From this
perspective, these kinds of family constitutions are more akin to
a will or trust instrument that exists to express the will of the
settlor than to a democratic constitution. The traditional rule, in
fact, was that irrevocable trusts could be modified only in limited
circumstances, based on respect for testator intent: “[A] testator
has a right to dispose of his own property with such restrictions
and limitations, not repugnant to law, as he sees fit, and . . . his
intentions ought to be carried out, unless they contravene some
positive rule of law, or are against public policy.”67
The need for an amendment process becomes more obvious
and pressing when one views the family constitution as a
democratic constitution rather than an amplified trust document.
As one scholar comments: “Formal provision for constitutional
amendment is now a near universal feature of national

64. CHRISTIAN G. STEWART, FAMILY LEGACY ASIA (HK) LTD., THE THREE FAMILY
CONSTITUTION ARCHETYPES 1 (2015), at 3. The same advisor writes that the
“Monument to the Founder” family constitution is one of the “three basic family
constitution archetypes.” Id. at 1. The others are “Family First Constitution” and
“Expert Structure.” Id.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Id. “It might be created in a top down fashion without any real participation
from the members of the rising generation of the family.” Id.
67. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889). Even long-standing,
irrevocable trusts can be modified under the right circumstances. The Claflin
doctrine states that a trust can be modified with the consent of all beneficiaries and
if the modification is not contrary to a material purpose of the trust. See id. The
Uniform Trust Code has softened the requirement somewhat, stating that the
modification must not be “inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.” See
UNIF. TR. CODE § 411(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). The Uniform Trust Code also
eliminates the requirement of consent from all beneficiaries as long as all interests
are adequately protected. See id. § 411(e).
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constitutions.”68 Democratic constitutions, in the main, provide
some mechanism for amendment. For example, Article V of the
U.S. Constitution allows for constitutional amendment if the
proposed change is properly ratified by the states.69 Whatever
shape they take, mechanisms are important because they
“promote processes of democratic self-government” and help
“facilitate certain valuable forms of constitutional precommitment, particularly those having to do with minority rights
and inclusion.”70 Family constitutions that are “monuments” to
the legacy of the constitution founders risk impairing these
democratic and inclusion values in ways we have already seen.
High-wealth families with constitutions should, therefore,
consider ways to create amendment power within their governing
documents. The legislative body, already constituted by the
family constitution, could easily be tasked with crafting a
procedure for constitutional amendment. Moreover, most family
constitutions provide for family assemblies and meetings at
which family members could vote on such proposals. Morgan
Stanley, in the family constitution template that the company
provides, does just this. Section seven of the template states”
“The Family Advisory Board may take any action it deems
appropriate … including amending the Constitution or its Bylaws, with the written consent of a majority of its then acting
voting members.”71
Creating an amendment power through family deliberation
and ratification would help transform a family constitution from
being a “monument” constitution to a “family first” constitution
that places a “premium on the family values of togetherness,

68. Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative
Perspective, 1 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
No. 347, 2011), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=10
70&context=public_law_and_legal_theory. There is great variation of what the rules
look like and in the level of difficulty.
69. “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the
legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing
amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part
of this Constitution, when ratified ….” U.S. CONST. art. V.
70. Dixon, supra note 68, at 102.
71. Family Constitutions and Family By-Laws, MORGAN STANLEY https://adviso
r.morganstanley.com/michelle.ward/documents/field/w/wa/ward-sofia-michelle/Fam
ily_Constitution_and_Family_By_Laws.pdf.
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equality and harmony”72 or a “wise” constitution that reflects an
“aware[ness] of the culture and capacity and skills of the client
family, as well as the transitions the family are facing.”73
Furthermore, regardless of the label put on the family
constitution, creating amendment power would help families
realize the constitutional values they seek to capture when
choosing to write a constitution.
Conclusion
No one expects a family constitution to replicate a
democratic constitution in each and every way possible. Families
are not vast political entities and they do not require the same
sophisticated level of governance that states do. Nevertheless,
family constitutions attempt to capture the form of a democratic
constitution and import its foundational design. It is also
therefore apt to measure the substance of the family constitution
against that of the democratic constitution, seeking an integration
of the democratic principles that enliven and illuminate political
constitutions. What emerges from this mapping exercise is that
family constitutions, in their current iterative state, focus on the
regulation and responsibilities of the family citizenry, failing
sometimes to secure and safeguard basic rights of equality and
fairness. To be constitutional both in design and principle, these
family governance documents must change. They must guarantee
family member rights and remedies and ensure that the
constitution, through amendment, remains sufficiently flexible
and relevant to meet family needs through the generations.

72. STEWART, supra note 64, at 4.
73. Id.

